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NOTE AND COMMENT
ATORNY'S LZN FOR SEaVICs-SSr-oF oP JUDGMENTs.-Anglo-Saxon
judges, as members of the legal profession, have shown an admirable freedom
from professional bias and class selfishness in dealing with questions involving the rights and privileges of members of their profession. With every
opportunity offered for treating lawyers as a favored class, they have been
able to maintain a detached and objective attitude toward them. Indeed, the
courts seem to have preferred to be charged with excessive severity in dealing with their brethren of the bar rather than give the slightest ground for
suspicion that they were capitalizing their power in the interest of the legal
fraternity.
A familiar example of the struggle to do absolute justice in regard to
professional claims occurs in connection with the attorney's charging lien
for services, and a recent case in the New York Court of Appeals presents
an interesting application of the problem. Beecher v. Peter A. Vogt Mfg. Co.
(N. Y., 192o) 125 N. E. 831. In this case the Vogt Company recovered a
judgment against Beecher and Smith, and thereupon Beecher and Smith
undertook to use a judgment against the Vogt Company which they had
obtained by assignment, as a set-off against this obligation. The Vogt Company was insolvent, and the attorneys for that company, who had not been
paid for their services in obtaining the judgment, claimed, a lien on the
judgment superior to the set-off. And the question was, whether the whole
of the Vogt judgment against Beecher and Smith could be neutralized by
the set-off of the cross judgment, or only the balance over and above the lien
held by the attorneys who obtained it for the Vogt Company.
As an abstract question of right, it seems unreasonable to hold that the
lien of the attorney should depend, and more than other liens depend, upon
the subsequent conduct of other persons. If the attorney has a valid claim
upon a judgment for his fees and expenses, why should this claim be destroyed without his consent or participation? This view was stated and
adopted by the Court of King's Bench in i79i in the case of Mitchell v.
1076. Approved Nov. 7, 1911, 1912, C. 715, sec. 1o, p. 792, declared unconstitutional in
Salisbury L. & I. Co. v. Massachusetts, 215 Mass. 371, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) iz96. Ibid.,
1914, P. 1057, resolution to amend passed senate and house 1914. To be submitted to
legislature of 19t5. (No further record). N. J., Const., Art. IV, sec. 9, amendment rejected Oct. 19, 1914. 1915 Sp. C. 2, p. 894. N. Y., Const., Art. I, amendment sees. 6 and
7. Sec. 1910, V. 2, p. 2049: 1911, V. 3, appendix p. 4: 1912, V. 2, p. 1381: 19T3, V. 3,
P. 2224: 1913, V. 4, P. 2491.
Adopted Nov. 4, 1913.
See 1914, v. 3, P. 2371. Pro.
posed amendment to the same section, 1917, v. 3, P. 2783: 1918, V. 3, P. 2083: 1919 V. 2, p.
1789. To be submitted to people at general election, 1919. Ibid., 1914, v. 2, c. 300, p.
864 (Syracuse); rgzr, v. 3, C. 593, P. 1825 (New York City). Repealed by 1915, v. 3, C.
6o6. Re-enacted i9x6, c. 112, p. 268. Ohio, 1904, p. 333. (See sec. 10-12th). Const.,
Art., XVIII, sec. io, amendment adopted Sept. 3, 1912. Pa., 1907, No. 315, p. 466. Unconstitutional. See Pennsylvania Mut. L. I,r. Co. v. Philadelphia, 242 Pa. 47. Const.,
Art. XVIII, sec. x6.
x9z5, p. 110s. To be submitted to the legislature of 1917.
Oreg.,
193, C. 269, p. 5o8. R. h, Const., Art. XVII, sec. I, amendment adopted Nov. 7, 1916.
Va., i9o6, c. 194, P. 317. Code Supp. 19xo, p. 66r. Wash., 1919, c. 135, p. 382, [Park
(Metropolitan) Districts Act.]
Wis., Const., Art. XI, amendment sec. 3a; 19o9 p. 831:
19!1, p. 1121, id., c. 665, p. sogo. Adopted Nov. 5, 1912. Const., Art. XI, amendment
see. 3b: 1911, p. 1114: 1913, p. 1374: id. c. 770, p. 1209, at 1213. Defeated Nov. 3, 1914.
Reprinted by permission from LoosE LEAP INDEX To LEGISLATION, October, 1919.
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Oldfield, 4 T. R. 123. But in 1795, jhe Court of Common Pleas, in Vaughan
v. Davies, 2 H. B1. 440, without any discussion, held that the attorney's lien
could not be allowed to prevent a party from having the full benefit of his
set-off. Four years later, in Hall v. Ody, 2 Bos. & Pul. 28, the Vaughan Case
was followed with evident reluctance as the "settled practice" of the court,
Lord Eldon remarking, "I find it to be the settled practice with much surprise,
since it stands in a direct contradiction to the practice of every other
court as well as to the principles of justice." But Rook. J., steeling his heart
against his legal brethren, thought it was fair enough, since "the attorney
looks in the first instance to the personal security of his client, and if beyond
that he can get any further security into his hands, it is a mere casual advantage." Lord Eldon was wrong, however, in the statement just quoted, as
applied to the Court of Chancery, which, while not free from inconsistencies,
seemed to follow the rule of the Common Pleas rather than that of the
King's Bench. Wright v. Mudie, I Sim. & S. 226; Mohawk Bank v. Burrows,
6 John C. (N.Y.) 317. The same difficulty arose in the Court of Exchequer,
and it was pointed out in Lane v. Pearse, 12 Price 742, that the practice of
that court had been confused with contradictory decisions, but on the merits
the judges were inclined to follow the hard rule of the Common Pleas.
The controversy was finally settled by the Rules of Hilary Term, 1832,
(Rule 93) providing that the attorney's lien should not be prejudiced by the
set-off of a judgment in a different suit, and this doctrine is still follow.'d
under the current English Rules and Orders. David v. Rees, [1904] 2 K. B.
435.
Some of this English judicial history is referred to by the New York
Court of Appeals in the case above cited, and the further history of the controversy as it persisted in the early New York decisions, is presented; with
the result, however, that the court was able to absolve itself from responsibility for choosing the true rule to be followed by concluding that the
attorney's lien had been given the same standing by statute as an equitable
assignment of the cause of action or judgment, and as such it was superior
to the claim of the set-off.
The prevailing rule in the United States, where the matter is not regulated by statute, recognizes the superior claim of the attorney's lien, thus following the present English practice: Leavenson v. Lafontane, 3 Kan. 523;
Ward v. Watson, 27 Neb. 768; Phillips v. MacKay, 54 N. J. L. 319 (fully
discussing the history and the merits of the question) ; Diehl v. Friester,
37 Ohio St. 473; Pirie v. Harkness, 3 S. D. 178; Roberts v. Mitchell, 94 Tenn.
277 (a well considered case) ; Currier v. Boston & Maine RR. Co., 37 N. H.
223; Renick v. Ludington, 16 W. Va. 378; Carter v. Davis, 8 Fla. 183; Stanley
v. Bouck, 107 Wis. 225. In many jurisdictions the legislature has come to the
assistance of the attorney and expressly given his lien for services priority
over executions issued on judgments employed by way of set-off: Brent v.
Brent, 24 Ill. App. 448; Adams v. Lee, 82 Ind. 587; Stone v. Hyde,
22 Me. 318. But the old rule of the English Common Pleas is still adhered
to in some states,--in a few as a principle appealing to the conscience or
conservatism of the court, as in McDonald v. Smith, 57 Vt. 502, -but more
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commonly because the legislature has taken the view that the attorney who
secured the judgment is entitled to no equity superior to that of his client,
and if his client's interest in the judgment is subject to the. set-off of another
judgment, then the lien of the attorney falls with it: Lindholn v. Itasca
Lumber Co., 64 Minn. 46; Langston v. Roby, 68 Ga. 406; Hurst v. Sheets, 21
Ia. 5o; Ex parte Lehman, 59 Ala. 631.
E. R. S.
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